How Democrats Fooled California’s Redistricting Commission

by Olga Pierce and Jeff Larson ProPublica, Dec. 21, 2011, 3:38 p.m.

Thisspring, a group of California Democrats gathered at a modern, airy officebuilding just a few blocks from the U.S. Capitol. The meeting was House membersonly 2014 no aides allowed 2014 and the mission was seemingly impossible.

In previous years, the party hadused its perennial control of California2019s state Legislature to draw districtmaps that protected Democratic incumbents. But in 2010, California voters putredistricting in the hands of a citizens2019 commission where decisions would beguided by public testimony and open debate.

The question facing HouseDemocrats as they met to contemplate the state2019s new realities was delicate:How could they influence an avowedly nonpartisan process? Alexis Marks, a Houseaide who invited members to the meeting, warned the representatives thatsecrecy was paramount. 201CNever say anything AT ALL about redistricting 2014 nospeculation, no predictions, NOTHING,201D Marks wrote in an email. 201CAnything cancome back to haunt you.201D

In the weeks that followed,party leaders came up with a plan. Working with the Democratic CongressionalCampaign Committee 2014 a national arm of the party that provides money and supportto Democratic candidates 2014 members were told to begin 201Cstrategizingabout potential future district lines,” according to another email.

The citizens2019 commission hadpledged to create districts based on testimony from the communities themselves,not from parties or statewide political players. To get around that, Democratssurreptitiously enlisted local voters, elected officials, labor unions andcommunity groups to testify in support of configurations that coincided withthe party2019s interests.

When they appeared before thecommission, those groups identified themselves as ordinary Californians and didnot disclose their ties to the party. One woman who purported to represent the Asiancommunity of the San Gabriel Valley was actually a lobbyist who grew up inrural Idaho, and lives in Sacramento.

In one instance, partyoperatives invented a local group to advocate for the Democrats2019 map.

California2019s Democratic representativesgot much of what they wanted from the 2010 redistricting cycle, especially inthe northern part of the state. 201CEvery member of the Northern CaliforniaDemocratic Caucus has a ticket back to DC,201D said one enthusiastic memo writtenas the process was winding down. 201CThis is a huge accomplishment that should becelebrated by advocates throughout the region.201D

Statewide, Democrats had been expected togain at most a seat or two as a result ofredistricting. But an internal party projection says that the Democrats willlikely pick up six or seven seats in a state where the party2019s voterregistrations have grown only marginally.

201CVery little of this is due todemographic shifts,201D said Professor Doug Johnson at the Rose Institute in LosAngeles. Republican areas actually had higher growth than Democratic ones. 201CBythe numbers, Republicans should have held at least the same number of seats,but they lost.201D

As part of a national look atredistricting, ProPublica reconstructed the Democrats2019 stealth success inCalifornia, drawing on internal memos, emails, interviewswith participants and map analysis. What emerges is a portrait of skilledpolitical professionals armed with modern mapping software and detailed voterinformation who managed to replicate the results of the smoked-filled rooms ofold.

The losers in this once-a-decadereshaping of the electoral map, experts say, were the state2019s voters. Theintent of the citizens2019 commission was to directly link a lawmaker2019s political fateto the will of his or her constituents. But as ProPublica2019s review makes clear,Democratic incumbents are once again insulated from the will of the electorate.

Democrats acknowledge that theyfaced a challenge in getting the districts they wanted in densely populated,ethnically diverse Southern California. The citizen commission initiallyproposed districts that would have endangered the political futures of severalDemocratic incumbents. Fighting back, some Democrats gathered in Washington anddiscussed alternatives. These sessions were sometimes heated.

201CThere was horse-tradingthroughout the process,201D said one senior Democratic aide.

The reviseddistricts were then presented to the commission by plausible-sounding witnesseswho had personal ties to Democrats but did not disclose them.

Commissioners declined todiscuss the details of specific districts, citing ongoing litigation. Butseveral said in interviews that while they were aware of some attempts tomislead them, they felt they had defused the most egregious attempts.

201CWhen you2019ve got so many peoplereporting to you or making comments to you, some of them are going to bepolitical shills,201D said commissioner Stanley Forbes, a farmer and bookstoreowner. 201CWe just had to do the best we could in determining what was for realand what wasn2019t.201D

Democrats acknowledge themeetings described in the emails, but said the gatherings 201Ccentered on201D informingmembers about the process. In a statement to ProPublica, Rep. Zoe Lofgren, headof California2019s delegation, said that members,201Cascitizens of the state of California, were well within their rights to makecomments and ensure that voices from communities of interest within theirneighborhoods were heard by the Commission.201D

201CThefinal product voted on by the Commission was entirely out of the hands of theMembers,201D said Lofgren. 201CThey, like any other Californian, were able to commentbut had no control over the process.201D

201CAtno time did the Delegation draw up a statewide map,201D Lofgren said. (Read Lofgren2019s full statement.) [1]

California2019s Republicans werehardly a factor. The national GOP stayed largely on the sidelines, andindividual Republicans had limited success influencing the commission.

201CRepublicans didn2019t really doanything,201D said Johnson. 201CThey were late to the party, and essentiallynon-entities in the redistricting process.201D

Fed-up voters create a commission

The once-a-decade redistrictingprocess is supposed to ensure that every citizen2019s vote counts equally.

In reality, politicians andparties working to advance their own interests often draw lines that make an individual2019svote count less. They create districts dominated by one party or politicalviewpoint, protecting some candidates (typically incumbents) while doomingothers. They can empower a community by grouping its voters in a singledistrict, or disenfranchise it by zigging the lines just so.

Over the decades, few partybosses were better at protecting incumbents than California2019s Democrats. NoDemocratic incumbent has lost a Congressional election in the nation2019s mostpopulous state since 2000.

Asthey drew the lines each decade, California2019s party bosses worked in secret. Butthe oddly shaped districts that emerged from those sessions were visible forall to see. Bruce Cain, a legendary mapmaker who now heads the University ofCalifornia2019s Washington center, once drew an improbable-looking state assemblydistrict that could not be traversed by car. (It crossed several impassablemountains.)

Cain proudlytold the story of the district, which was set up for one of the governor2019sfriends. Cain said he justified the odd shape by saying it pulled together thestate2019s largest population of endangered condors. 201CIt wasn2019t legitimate on anylevel,201D Cain recalled.

The 2010 ballot initiative givingthe citizen commission authority over Congressional districts was sold tovoters as a game changer. Not surprisingly, it wasstrenuously opposed by California2019s Democrats, who continue to control the Statehouse.

No fewer than 35 Democratic politicians 2014including Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi 2014 and their allies spent a totalof $7 million to campaign against the proposition. The effort included mailingsfrom faux community groups that derided the commission2019s $1 million annual budgetas 201Cbureaucraticwaste.201D [2]Despite this effort,Californians voted 61 percent to 39 percent to wrest federal redistricting fromthe hands of state lawmakers.

Immediately, Democrats beganorganizing to influence the citizen commission. There were numerous opportunities.

According to civics textbooks,the aim of redistricting is to group 201Ccommunities of interest201D so thatresidents in a city, neighborhood or ethnic group wield political power byvoting together. The commission took an expansive view of this concept, ultimatelydefining a 201Ccommunity of interest201D as anything from a neighborhood to workerson the same commute, or even areas sharing 201Cintense beach recreation.201D [3]

This gave savvy players anopening to draw up maps that benefited one party or incumbent and then find 2014or concoct 2014 201Ccommunities of interest201D that justified them.

Democratsset out to do exactly that.

OnMarch 16, members of the California delegation gathered at Democratic Partyoffices to discuss how to handle redistricting. They agreed that congressmenfrom the various regions of California 2014 North, South and Central 2014would meet separately to 201Ccreate a plan of action,201D according to an email recountingthe day2019s events [4] by Alexis Marks, the House aide. Among the first tasks, Markswrote, was determining 201Chow to best organize communities of interest.201D

Democrats were already working201CBEHIND THE SCENES201D to 201Cget info out201D about candidates for the job ofcommission lawyer who were viewed as unfriendly. 201CI2019ll keep you in the loop,but do not broadcast,201D Marks wrote.

201CThe CA delegation has beenbroken down into regions that will be discussing redistricting at the memberlevel,201D read another party email from late March. 201CMembers will be asked to present ideas onboth issues201D 2014 communities of interest and district lines 2014 201Candwill be asked to come to some consensus about how to adopt a regional strategyfor redistricting.201D

Over the next several weeks,California Democrats huddled with Mark Gersh, the party2019s top mapmaking guru.Officially, Gersh works with the Foundation for the Future, a nonprofit whose declared goal [5]is 201Cto help Democrats getorganized for the fight of the decade; the fight that will determine Democraticfortunes in your state and in Washington, D.C. for years to come:Redistricting!201D

The foundation is well fundedfor this fight. Its supporters include longtime supporters of the DemocraticParty: the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees as wellas the American Association for Justice (previously known as the Association of Trial Lawyers ofAmerica). Thefoundation was launchedin 2006 when [6] Nancy Pelosi2019s office workedwith both groups to start it.

Neither Gersh nor participants would describe in detail what was discussed at the meetings. But from Marks2019 emails and other sources, it is clear that California2019s Democrats sat down together to discuss mutually agreeable districts that would protect incumbents.

The value of coordinating efforts to influence the commission cannot be overstated. If each Democrat battled separately for the best district, it was likely that one Congress member2019s gain would harm countless colleagues. Creating Congressional districts is a lot like a Rubik2019s cube: Each change reshapes the entire puzzle. The Democrats2019 plan was to deliver synchronized testimony that would herd the commission toward the desired outcomes. If it worked perfectly, the commissioners might not even know they had been influenced.

Over the summer, Marks sent outmore than 100 [4] emails [7] about redistricting [8], according to multiple recipients ofthe messages. According to House records, Marks earned $112,537 in 2010 in herpost as deputy director of the California Democratic delegation. That makes hera federal employee. But although many of the messages were sent during the work day, a spokesman insisted Marks did so in herafter-hours role as a political staffer for Democrats. They were sent from aGmail account. Lofgren’s office did not make Marks available for comment, citing policy that staffers do not speak on the record. Instead, they pointed to Rep. Lofgren’s statement [1].

Federal employees are notallowed to do campaign work on government time, or use government resources,according to House ethics rules.

The emails alerted staff andlegislators when the commission was scheduled to discuss their districts andthey encouraged them to have allies testify to 201Ccommunity of interest201D linesthat supported their maps.

Marks told members they would beasked to raise money for a legal challenge if things didn2019t work out. Thedelegation, she said, was working with Marc Elias, who heads anorganization called the National Democratic Redistricting Trust. (The trustshares a website with The Foundation for The Future.)

Last year the trust persuaded theFederal Election Commission [9]to allow members to raise moneyfor redistricting lawsuits without disclosing how the money was spent, how muchwas raised, and who had given it.

The commission blinds itself

Back in California, thecommission was getting organized. Its first task was to pick commissioners. Theballot initiative excluded virtually anyone who had any previous politicalexperience. Run for office? Worked as a staffer or consultant to a politicalcampaign? Given more than $2,000 to a candidate in any year? 201CCohabitated201D for more than 30 days in the past year with anyone inthe previous categories? You2019re barred. [10]

More than 36,000 people applied.The state auditor2019s office winnowed the applicants to a group of 60 finalists.Each party was allowed to strike 12 applicants without explanation. Then, thestate used Bingo-style bouncing balls in a cage to pick eight commissioners 2014three Republicans, three Democrats and two people whose registration read201Cdecline to state201D (California-speak for independent). The randomly selected commissionersthen chose six from the remaining finalists to complete the panel.

The result was a commission thatincluded, among others, a farmer, a homemaker, a sports doctor and anarchitect. Previous redistrictings had been executed bypolitical pros with intimate knowledge of California2019s sprawling politicalgeography. The commissioners had little of that expertise 2014 and one of theirfirst acts was to deprive themselves of the data that might have helped themspot partisan manipulation. [11]

The law creating the commissionbarred it from considering incumbents2019 addresses, and instructed it not to drawdistricts for partisan reasons.

The commissioners decided to gofurther, agreeing not to even look at data that would tell them how prospectivemaps affected the fortunes of Democrats or Republicans. This left the commissionerseffectively blind to the sort of influence the Democrats were planning.

One of the mapping consultantsworking for the commission warned that it would be difficult to competentlydraft district lines without party data. She was overruled.

The lack of political data was201Cliberating,201D said Forbes, the commissioner. 201CWe had no one to please exceptourselves, based on our best judgment.201D

201CIthink,201D he said, 201Cwe did a pretty good job.201D

Thecommission2019s judgments on how to draw lines, Forbes andothers said, was based on the testimony from citizens about communitiesof interest.

201CWewere provided quite a number of maps from various organizations,201D said anothercommissioner, attorney Jodie Filkins-Webber. If the groups were basing theirmaps on political data to favor one party, 201Cthey certainly did not tell usthat.201D

201CDistrictscould have been drawn based on voter registration,201D Filkins-Webber said, 201Cbut wewould never have known it.201D

Thecommission received a torrent of advice 2014 a total of 30,000 separatepieces of testimony and documents. Records suggest the commission neverdeveloped an effective method for organizing it all. The testimony was kept ina jumbleof handwritten notes and computer files [12]. The commissioners were oftenleft to recall testimony by memory.

The difficulties in digestingand weighing the reams of often-conflicting testimony enhanced the value ofpeople or groups who came bearing draft maps.

201COther people offered testimony;we offered solutions,201D said Stuart Waldman, president of the Valley Industryand Commerce Association, a powerful business group outside Los Angeles thatpersuaded the commission to adopts its Congressional map for the San FernandoValley.

How Democrats lockeddown Northern California

Redistricting is a chess game for people with superb spatial perception.Sometimes, anchoring a single line on a map can make everything fall intoplace.

According to an internal memo, Democrats recognized early on that theycould protect nearly every incumbent in Northern California if they won a fewkey battles. First, they had to make sure no district crossed the Golden GateBridge.Then, they had to draw anew seat that pulled sufficient numbers of Democrats from Contra Costa County intoa district that included Republicans from the San Joaquin Valley.

The man with the most to losewas Rep. Jerry McNerney, who represented an octopus-shaped district that hadscooped in Democrats from the areas east of San Francisco. McNerney2019s prospectsseemed particularly dismal. Early in the year, he made The Washington Post2019s nationallist of top 10 likely redistricting victims [13].

Republicansmoved first, attempting to create a district that would keep San Joaquin Countywhole and pick up conservative territory to the south. But then a previouslyunknown group calling itself OneSanJoaquin entered the fray.

OneSanJoaquindescribed itself as a nonprofit, but records show it is not registered as suchin any state. It has no identifiable leadership but it does have a Facebookpage [14], called OneSanJoaquin, created by the Google account OneSanJoaquin.

Thepage was posted in early April, just as the commission began taking testimony. Itsentries urged county residents to download maps and deliver pre-packaged testimony.

On the surface, the OneSanJoaquinpage seemed to be serving Republicans2019 interests. But Democrats were one moveahead and understood that a united valley would inevitably lead to aDemocratic-leaning district. (Republicans apparently did not understand that federalvoting rights requirements ruled out their proposed district, since it wouldhave interfered with the Latino district to the south. That misconception wasencouraged by the maps on the OneSanJoaquin page, which were drawn to make thislook possible.)

In fact, the only way to make adistrict with 201Cone San Joaquin201D was to pull in the Democrats in eastern ContraCosta 2014 the far reaches of San Francisco2019s Bay-area liberals.

The author of OneSanJoaquin2019smaps was not identified on the Facebook page, but ProPublica has learned it wasPaul Mitchell, a redistricting consultant hired by McNerney [15].

Transcripts show that more thana dozen people delivered or sent the canned testimony to the commission, whichaccepted it without question. There2019s no sign that commissioners were awaresome of the letters had been downloaded from the mysterious OneSanJoaquin page.

After the commission finished,McNerney announced he was moving to the newly created San Joaquin district torun for re-election. It was a huge improvement for him. In 2010, he barely wonhis district, beating his opponent by just one point. If the 2010 election werere-run in his new district, he would have won by seven points, according to theDemocrats2019 internal analysis. (McNerney2019s office did not respond to requests forcomment.)

Summing up the story, aninternal Democratic memo said the GOP had been decisively out-maneuvered 201CTheirhope was to create a Republican Congressional seat,201D the memo said. 201CTheir planbackfired.201D

201CMcNerney ends up with saferdistrict than before,201D Mitchell2019s firm tweeted, after McNerney announced hiscandidacy in his new district. 201CWow! How did he do that?201D

An under-funded commission

While players attempting toinfluence the process were well funded, the commission struggled with a lack oftime and money. They responded, inpart, by reducing citizens2019 opportunities for input.

The budget for the whole mapdrawing undertaking was just over $1 million. At first, the commission had its publichearings transcribed 2014 then the money ran out and they stopped.

The commissioners worked forfree, with only a small stipend for expenses. As a result most kept their dayjobs at the same time they tried to juggle their roles as commissioners.

It was a grueling schedule, with 35 public hearings taking place over just three months. 201CI had three days off between201D April and August, said Commissioner Filkins-Webber, who maintained her legal practice while serving. 201CI was working basically on average18 hours a day.201D

Thecommissioners also had to deal with public anger. The Tea Party in Californiadecided to use the hearings as a forum to protest the Voting Rights Act, forinstance, and at one hearing got so rowdy that police intervened.

Expertshired by the commission to actually draw the maps were also overworked andunderpaid. Half a dozen times the meeting transcripts contain references to mapdrawers working overnight to prepare maps.

Overwhelmedby the task at hand, the commission decided to essentially shut down publicparticipation halfway through the process. After the first round of drafts, whichwere widely criticized and abandoned, the commission stopped releasing formaldrafts. More importantly, commissioners stopped holding hearings, which meantthe next draft was prepared without public input.

Thecommission moved its meetings to Sacramento, not far from where party bosseshad once gathered in secret to set the lines. The commission2019s meetings werewebcast to the public. But only those with the resources and time couldparticipate.

201CYouhave to ask yourself, who has the money to send people up to Sacramento likethat,201D said Eugene Lee, voting rights project directorat the Asian Pacific American Legal Center, which was active in organizinggrassroots participation in the redistricting process.

201CWedidn2019t have the money to do that. No way.201D

Thecommission released no further drafts. In July, it made public a 201Cdraft final.201DVoters had two weeks to submit comments before it became final. Most of thosecomments came from insiders who had been closely watching the Sacramentomeetings.

Southern California Democrats also win

Forthose who could stay engaged, the Sacramento phase of the commission2019s work provedrewarding. One politician who benefitedwas Southern California Congresswoman Judy Chu.

Whenit appeared that Chu would get an unfavorable district late in the game, agroup with ties to the congresswoman went before the commission in Sacramento andconvinced the commissioners to draw a favorable map that included her politicalstronghold, a town called Rosemead. Chu enjoyed broad support in Rosemead,where she was first elected to the school board in 1992 and later served in the state assembly.

Thegroup, which called itself the Asian American Education Institute, worked withPaul Mitchell, the same consultant who helped engineer the triumph of NorthernCalifornia Democrats.

Records show that crucial last-minute testimony in favor of Chu2019s district wasdelivered by Jennifer Wada, who told commissioners she was representing theinstitute and the overall Asian-American community. Wada did not mentionthat she lives and works as a registered lobbyist in Sacramento, 400 miles fromthe district, or that she grew up in rural Idaho, where most of her family stilllives. Wada says she washired by the institute to 201Cconvey their concernsabout Asian and Pacific Islander representation201D to the commission.

The second witness was ChrisChaffee, who said he was a consultant for the institute and an employee ofRedistricting Partners, Mitchell2019s firm.

Commissioners accepted this mapwithout asking a basic question: Who, exactly, was theAsian American Education Institute representing?

The group2019s tax records show ithad no full-time employees. Its website is barebones, and clicking on the 201Cgetactive201D button on the home page [16]leads nowhere, simply returning users to the home page.

There2019s another interestingfeature of the Web site: the domain name is registeredto a man named Bill Wong [17], a political consultant who has worked on multipleChu campaigns, as well as her husband2019s successful bid for Judy Chu2019s old stateassembly seat. Chu paid Wong $5,725 for consulting work in 2010, FEC recordsshow. Her husband, Mike Eng, donated $4,500 to the Asian American EducationInstitute in 2010 and 2011.

The institute, saidWong, 201Cargued to keep communities of interest together. Since Rep. Chu has beena strong advocate for Asian communities, it would make sense for her torepresent them.201D Wong added that he 201Cdiscussedredistricting with a number of Asian-Americanlegislators.201D

An email obtained by ProPublicashows Amelia Wang, Chu2019s chief of staff, telling Chu and Bill Wong about testimonysubmitted by another Asian group, Coalition of Asian Pacific Americans for FairRedistricting, which also intervened at the last minute to offer similar maps.In case that didn2019t do the trick, Mitchell himself went before the commission,urging the commissioners to accept the maps submitted by the institute (hisemployer) and the coalition.

And that2019s what the commissiondid, incorporating proposed lines for both groups and drawing a map that included Rosemead inChu2019s new district [18].

Wang told ProPublica thatChu2019s office and the institute 201Cdid communicate about keeping communities ofinterest together, including Rosemead. However, Rep. Chu did not hire Bill Wongfor redistricting or to testify on her behalf before the commission.201D

201CRep. Chu hasrepresented a united Rosemead city since 2001,201D said Wang, 201Cit would have beena tragic mistake to divide it.201D

Thoughthe process turned out well for Chu, it didn2019t work out so well for the town ofSouth El Monte.

Tomake room for Rosemead in Chu2019s district, South El Monte 2014 85 percent Latino2014 got bumped into another district across the mountains that is much lessLatino, and much more affluent.

Thetown2019s mayor, Luis Aguinaga, say the new lines 201Cdon2019t make sense.201D South ElMonte is now split off from sister communities in the San Gabriel Valley 2014including North El Monte and El Monte.

201CWe2019realways on the same side, always fighting for the same issues,201D Aguinaga said.201COn this side of the San Gabriel Valley we have a voice. If we2019re apart it willbe much harder to be heard.201D

Other communities lost, too.

OutsideLos Angeles, residents of what2019s known as Little Saigon begged the commissionto undo what they saw as decades of discrimination and put the U.S.2019s largestVietnamese community together in one district. Instead, the community was splitin two 2014 a result of testimony by supporters of Rep. Loretta Sanchez,including a formerstaffer [19] and oneof her wedding guests [19], to get her a safe district. A large section of Little Saigon endedup in a district with Long Beach, a town that is 1 percent Vietnamese.

201CResidents who live in LittleSaigon share the same needs, but if they2019re in two different districts they maynot be represented,201D said Tri Ta, a City Council member from the area.

201CThis district is characterizedby the Port of Long Beach,201D the commission writes in its final report, 201Cone ofthe world2019s busiest seaports and the area2019s largest employer.201D

201CIt does not make sense to put thearea known as Little Saigon in a district with Long Beach,201D Ta said. 201CThe twoareas are distinctively different.201D

“Congresswoman Sanchez believed strongly throughout the redistricting process that the population growth of the Latino community should be accurately reflected in the newly drawn congressional districts,” said Adrienne Elrod, Sanchez’s Chief of Staff, in a statement, “She’s glad that members of the Orange County community shared her views, and as a result, was pleased to see them take an active role.”

Paul Mitchell, the consultantwhose work had such a large impact on the commission2019s decisions, said votersbenefited from the work done by him and others deeply involved in the process.The commissioners, he said, 201Cknew some of the testimonywas being fabricated by outside groups. But what were they to do? They couldn2019tcreate a screen of all testimony and ferret out all the biases.201D

The work he did on behalf of his diverse group of clients, he said, 201Ccreated better maps2014 regardless of if they came with the additional benefit of helping somelocal city, union, or incumbent that was the client,201D Mitchell said.

201CMyonly regret is that we didn’t do more.201D

Corrections: This story originally stated that the Asian population of Long Beach was less 1 percent. It has been corrected to say that the Vietnamese population of Long Beach is 1 percent. The story also previously stated that Rep. Judy Chu previously served as a state senator. In fact, she served in the state assembly.